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The Yearly Two Foot Shelf: Suggestions
For Changing Our Reviewing
Court Procedures

JACK LEAVITT*

As the number of cases appealed to our reviewing courts continues -to multiply annually, the judicial process has become increasingly overburdened and the necessity for appellate court reform has become more apparent. Responding to that need, the
State Bar of Californiaappointed a special committee to study the
problem and make recommendations for reform of the appellate
court system. In this article, Mr. Leavitt analyzes the problems
facing the appellate courts and some of the solutions proposed by
the State Bar Committee. The author also presents and discusses his own recommendations for change, which emphasize
streamlining appellate court procedures rather than increasing the
number of judges or proliferatingthe presentjudicial hierarchies.
Writing in 1906, Dean Roscoe Pound hoped that in the "near fu-

ture" our courts would become "swift and certain agents of justice,
B.A., 1951, Brooklyn College; LL.B., 1957, M.A., 1958, University of Illinois; LL.M., 1963, University of California, Berkeley. Consultant to California Judicial Council, 1970-71.
Reviewing court judges throughout the state have given me information which provided the background knowledge for this article. Their disagreement with some-or
all-of my proposals in no way lessened the help they offered. The California Trial
Lawyers Association, at their 10th Annual Convention, allowed me a platform for my
ideas on appellate reform and are publishing a slightly edited version of that speech in a
forthcoming issue of the CTLA Journal. B.E. Witkin has assured me, almost daily,
that I will never understand this subject as well as he does and has encouraged me to
prove his claim by publishing this article. For all these kindnesses, much thanks.
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whose decisions will be acquiesced in and respected by all."' That
future, however, has yet to arrive. Pound's expectations may have
been only a stylistic device to end his catalogue of misgivings about
the administration of justice, for nothing in his analysis or the course
of legal reform would convert a doubter into an optimist. A current
review of Pound's horizons has registered the warning that
we are approaching the total bankruptcy of our remedy system.
. . . The legal system of the United States simply cannot carry
the weight that is on it. . . . American civil justice has broken
down; the legal system fails to perform the tasks that may be ex-

pected of it.2

Speaking directly about our courts of review, those tribunals whose
powers are invoked to correct shortcomings in our legal process,
another reformer has observed:
While there is no general public demand for an improvement
in the practices of appellate tribunals, it is only because relatively
few people have occasion to know what goes on in them. Certainly the members of the bar are not satisfied with the manner in
which most appellate courts conduct themselves, and every effort
should be made to improve their procedures. 3
In California, this dissatisfaction has prompted a special state bar
committee on appellate courts (the Hufstedler Committee) to declare,
"If we continue the present system without appreciable changes, it
will be hopelessly mired down in its own workload, or must be expanded to such huge size that it will be unworkable."'4 Even B.E.
Witkin, the legal writer who is never at a loss for words or ideas,
has had to adopt Hamlet's maxim, "0, reform it altogether," in
various speeches around the state.
Since a reviewing court is a mundane analogy to the spiritual
promise that the evils of this world will be corrected in the next one,
its failures affect us all. The remoteness of the higher courts must
not obscure their significance or their weaknesses.
1. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, in LANDMARKS OF LAW 180, 194 (R. Henson ed. 1960).
2. J. FRANK, AMEmcAN LAw: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM at xxi, 122, 182
(1969).
3. A. VANDERBILT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 1246 (1952).

4. Report of the Special Committee re Appellate Courts, 47 CAL. S.BJ. 29
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Hufstedlei Report-after its chairman]; see also Gustafson, Some Observations About California Courts of Appeal, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 167
(1971); Molinari, The Decisionmaking Conference of the California Court of Appeal,
57 CALIF. L. REv. 606 (1969); Haynes, Reform of Appellate Procedure, PROCEEDINGS
OF Tim SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 80 (1933); Hollzer,
The Appellate Court Problem, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 111 (1933).
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Leaving aside substantive law questions and focussing on procedural considerations, we rapidly note that the search for error below is
a voluminous business. To serve her approximately 20,000,000
citizens and 35,000 attorneys, California has an authorized strength
of 55 reviewing court judges: 7 for the supreme court bench and
48 for the court of appeal. During the 1970-71 fiscal year, the supreme court received 3,179 filings and responded with 202 written
opinions.' In the same period, the 13 divisions of the court of appeal
received 8,684 filings and wrote 3,746 majority decisions.6
We are reaching a point where to keep current each Court of
Appeal judge must write an average of 100 opinions a year, participate in 200 more cases which require written opinions, and in
more than 600 other matters relating to petitions for alternative
writs or motions not resulting in an opinion.7
By a linear measure of interest to space-conscious attorneys and librarians, our reviewing courts recently have occupied more than two
feet-25 horizontal inches-of bookshelf room for their annually published views. This persistent flow should be compared with the labors
of Dr. Charles W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard University,
who gathered a "great company of the wisest, the wittiest, the most
entertaining minds of all ages and every land" in a single multi-volume
collection, capable of being stored on a "Five-Foot Shelf." 8
Because no statewide statistics are kept to show the number of appellate reversals, modifications and grants of relief, the specific results of
this activity can be proven only through the impractical drudgery of
a case-by-case tabulation. Even so, those of us familiar with the
routine workings of the appellate system recognize that a lower court's
action is nearly always upheld against claims of error, either through
affirmance of a trial court judgment or through denial of relief in an
original proceeding. Evaluated only by the direct impact of their
conclusions, the reviewing courts are in the business of telling a disappointed litigant that he should have lost. Doing so-while also
recognizing error or making new law as the occasion warrants-takes
time. From the filing of a notice of appeal to the filing of an opinion
requires 14 1/2 months for the average criminal case, 20 months for
5. JuDIcrAL CoUNCmL op

CAIFoRNul,

1972 ANNUAL

REPoRT 65.

During

1932-33, however, the supreme court decided 346 cases by written opinion. See
Haynes, supra note 4, at 82.
6. JuDIcrA. CouNciL. oF CALiFoNmuA, 1972 ANNUAL REPORT 68.
7. Associate Justice Robert S. Thompson, address to the Lawyers Club of Los
Angeles, reported in the Los Angeles Metropolitan News, March 30, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
See also Hufstedler Report, supra note 4, at 29; Molinari, supra note 4, at 610.
8. See HARVARD CLASSIcS READING GurnE 5 (.C. Eliot ed. 1930).
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the average civil case.9 (Petitions to the state supreme court naturally

extend the wait for finality.)
This delay is the core of our appellate problem. Once the factually
disputed issues ih a case have been resolved, we become impatient

with prolonged uncertainty over whether the trial judge understood
the law or adequately performed his job.

Waiting time, followed by

more waiting time, necessarily distorts the issues as the affected parties remember them and creates so many false hopes or fears that
the final result (including its financial costs) may provide little relief for the problem the courts were originally asked to solve. (For
how long should an injured plaintiff have to depend on the compas-

sion of his creditors before he receives, as cash on the barrelhead, his
share of the money which a jury had awarded him? When should
a landowner know for certain that he must specifically perform a contract for sale? How many years should a convicted defendant serve
in prison before the judgment under which he is confined is reversed?

How soon should a developer be told "start digging" or "start packing" when his zoning variance is challenged as having been invalidly
granted?)
The tension between a need for results and a desire for good results

pervades the system. Observing that delay is serious to a litigant who
may have only one case in his lifetime, and that case affecting his

livelihood, reputation or fortune, a New York high court judge once
insisted:
Far better that his case be heard speedily and disposed of, than
that some very fine opinion be handed down by an appellate
court, meeting with the approval of the press, of school-masters
and publicists .... The main or most important thing in the administration of justice, outside of fairness and impartiality, is a
speedy hearing of the cause. 10
9. Hufstedler Report, supra note 4, at 29. See also Hollzer, supra note 4, at
114, commenting that, as of 40 years ago, "in most of the civil cases it takes more
than a year from the time an appeal has been initiated to dispose of the same, and
that in a very large percentage of these, particularly where the cause originates in Los
Angeles County, it requires from two to two and a half years to determine the appeal." Also see Smith, The Bench, The Bar and The Public, PROCEEDiNGS o THE
Eo-rns ANNuAL MEETNG OF Tim STATE BAR oF CALIFORNIA 118, 124 (1935), declaring that:
Complaint at delay is now directed to appeals rather than to trial. It is felt
that the spread of time is too great between final judgment in the trial court
and the hearing of the appeal by the court of review. This will doubtless soon
be corrected either by legislation or by rule of court. Perhaps as to criminal
cases it may be done by the adoption of the English system, by which criminal
appeals within two or three weeks after trial are brought up and argued orally
and decided for the most part from the bench.
10. Hollzer, supra note 4, at 114, quoting an otherwise unidentified comment of
Judge Crane of the New York Court of Appeals.
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Persuasive as this argument is, it runs head-on into other quotable
advice from the same judge.
We judges somehow have formed the idea that it is more important to dispose of cases quickly than to dispose of them correctly. . . I have even heard the foolish boast of a judge as to
the great number of cases he had disposed of during the term.
. . . We Americans are charged with the fault of bulking everything in size. If it is big it must be great; if the amount is large
it must be important. Let not our courts be guilty of this charge.
Measure our work not by the amount done, but rather by the
quality of that which is done.11
What we are seeking, of course, is a systematized way of giving
prompt, individual attention to litigants-a judicial equivalent of massproduced custom tailoring. In timely fashion, we hope to be fair to
one and fair to all. This appealing but elusive principle demands
that each case be determined on its unique merits while the reviewing
court judges keep in mind all previous decisions which limit their possible alternatives. To a large extent-perhaps to the largest possible
extent in so expansive a society-these objectives are being reached
daily, with the prime exception of speed and the occasional failure of
consistency in decision. 12 The mechanics of decision making reflect
the best efforts of a talented, conscientious and incorruptible bench
whose virtues, once acknowledged, must now be redirected.
Proposals for redirection include many variants but few surprises.
Unlike breakthroughs in the physical sciences, where a new theory
may become operative even if its causes are unknown, changes in
human relationships, like the law, are brought about only on the basis
of a deeper understanding. We cannot be surprised by the steps we
are being asked to take, since each step must be justified by optimism
based on past experience. Nothing too new--even when envisioned by
a forensic Einstein-will work. How could it? Unless we understand
the process, we cannot evaluate the results as fair or accurate. To
analyze the appellate system, therefore, we must investigate familiar
disputations and reach virtually predictable conclusions. The focal
points will be aimed at disagreements about the need for more judges,
the establishment of separate criminal and civil benches, the creation
of new court hierarchies, the necessity of extensive records on appeal,
the requirement that judges know something about the cases they
11. Haynes, supra note 4, at 80.
12. See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 26
Cal. App. 3d 549, 554, 103 Cal. Rptr. 63, 66 (1972) (concurring opinion). People
v. Marshall, 273 Cal. App. 2d 423, 427, 78 Cal. Rptr. 16, 18 (1969).
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are deciding, the use of nonjudicial researchers and opinion writers,
the value of oral argument and the need for published opinions.
From this recognition of problem areas, my own conclusions,
summed up neatly, call for easily implemented changes of major consequence: Staff researchers should take over the initial screening burden from the judges; oral argument should be eliminated except at the
court's desire or on counsel's request in his brief, indicating why the
written word is inadequate to cover the subject; and most opinions
should be only a few lines long unless the court itself or all litigants
expressly call for a full opinion. The arguable wisdom of these ideasand the apparent inadequacy of other suggestions-comprise the remainder of this article.
APPOINTMENT OF MORE JUDGES

Solving problems of judicial administration by adding more judges
to the state roster is a recognized necessity as well as an inadequate
solution. "The shortage of judges for Courts of Appeal is, sad to
say, not likely to be recognized by the average lawyer," commented
a retired Associate Justice of that court, 3 who later pointed out,
"Adding twenty-four Court of Appeal judges immediately would not
even bring us to the level of staffing of appellate courts which those
sister states now enjoy."' 4 Pressing against this approach, however,
are critics who rate the call for additional judges as an ineffectual
strategy. Even in 1933 the situation in California made it clear that
in spite of a very large increase in the number of our appellate
tribunals and in the number of judges serving thereon-which additions have very considerably increased the burdens imposed
upon the taxpayers-we are still confronted with the serious de-

lays in the disposition of a large percentage of the appeals in civil
cases. 5
The experience nationally has been similar. More robes, gavels and
judges superimposed onto an otherwise unreformed system prove little help in eliminating delays or backlogs. Although the reason for
this failure has yet to be isolated, the warning against "too many
cooks" may spill over to our courtrooms. "Inevitably, the upping of
the number increases administration-judges' committees are formed,
meetings are held, time is lost in moving cases to this judge, deferring the earlier order of that judge, and so on; but we have no statisti13. Gustafson, supra note 4, at 201.
14. Id. at 203.

15. Hollzer, supranote 4, at 116.
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cal estimate of how substantial the delay is."' t1

(Additional explanations include the increase of inefficiency with the increase of judges;
the growing complexity of litigated matters, regardless of how many
judges are available; and the lack of quality in judicial appointments.1 7) Progress, by whatever values we describe it, cannot be
evoked by numbers alone.
To reject this caution is easy enough. Ignoring warnings of the
inevitable is a characteristic way of coping with our difficulties. But
what we must then do is become master mathematicians, making certain that the appointment of new judges is carried out with proper
equations. The future ratio of judges to cases should improve when
compared with the disappointing present-or where's the good in all
those swearing-in ceremonies? In anticipating these figures, the Hufstedler Committee has shown:
If the number of cases handled by the Court of Appeal in the Second District (Los Angeles, Ventura, Santa Barbara and San Louis
Obispo Counties) continues at a straight line rate (and the past
growth has been more dramatic than that) by 1990, the Second
District will consist of 140 justices writing 10,000 opinions per
year.' s
Like the statement that glass is a liquid,1 9 this projection appears
plausible but impossible. We know that the judicial community will
somehow be scaled down to a modest size. The size, therefore, will
have to depend on factors other than the caseload ratio-which means
that additional judgeships will best be established only when the personnel needs of a new decision making system become apparent.
Rather than constantly augmenting the ranks in the hope that gubernatorial appointments can outrace appellate controversies, we should
develop the best possible system for our present judiciary. Only to the
extent that the new system will become more satisfactory with more legal architects should we increase the number of reviewing court
judges. Many hands make light work only when the labors are sensibly divided.
SEPARATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL REVIEWING COURTS

Many recent volumes of published decisions could be titled, "Subtleties of California Criminal Law, with Special Emphasis on Search
and Seizure, Together with Miscellaneous Other Legal Topics of Interest to the Bench and Bar." The coverage given to these criminal
16. J. F ANK, supra note 2, at 6.
17. Id.
18. Hufstedler Report, supra note 4, at 29.
19. F. MALONEY, GLASS IN THE MODERN WORLD 9 (1968).
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cases may gratify practitioners in the felony field but have only incidental interest, at best, to the greater number of attorneys working in
civil law. Not only do the unread criminal decisions take up a disproportionate amount of library space, they also delay decisions on
cases of more claimed significance than disputes about freedom, punishment and social order, i.e., those cases affecting money or property. "Why not," the proposal often surfaces, "have a criminal bench
split off from the civil bench? With separate reviewing courts, the
criminal matters could be given the attention they deserve without
'20
penalizing all other litigants.
Closely analyzed, this suggestion has two facets: an implied increase in judicial personnel to deal with the divided calendars, and an
assumed separability of legal questions into criminal and civil fragments. Neither facet, in my view, justifies an appellate divorce.
Mustering additional judges to keep working in the same old ways,
as we have seen, promises little relief for court congestion. Is a restriction on subject matter jurisdiction enough of a change in procedure to avoid this difficulty? Why should it be? The quarrels we
have with the appellate system in California rarely include the expertise of the judges. What the court decides, its members understand.
The chief value of specialization is the short term advantage that the
second time around on a particular controversy may be easier than the
first time-but this edge is minimized when most controversies routinely
reappear. The practice of having cases assigned to appellate divisions in
rotation or through some other fortuitous choice means that each judge
will soon enough face-and face again-the full range of unique problems. By knowing the issues he will be able to-and should-make
correct decisions, even to the point of breaking with precedent when
advisable. (The gravest charge against a specialist is that he knows so
well what has gone on in the past that he refuses to change even a wrong
principle because doing so would dilute his superior knowledge of its
flaws.) Neither speed nor wisdom is a necessary consequence of a
limited outlook.
As to a possible segregation between civil and criminal law, we
realize that for most practitioners the law does offer a narrow compass. An attorney may be professionally respected and economically
successful, and still know nothing about antitrust defenses, suspension of the power of alienation, labor arbitration, corporate dissolution, marital dissolution, lesser included offenses or pleadings in admiralty. Beyond the limits we have selected for our professional ex20. But see L. ORmELD, CmnNAL APPIELs IN AMERICA 224 (1939).
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posure lie only referral fees. Is it therefore feasible to promote such
compartmentalization in our reviewing courts? I see no chance of
doing so to advantage.
While the substantive elements differ between our various specialities,
the rules for perfecting our heterogeneous rights have a common-and
often identical-foundation. In civil law as well as criminal law we
must resolve disputes over statutory interpretation, the relevancy of
evidence, claimed jury misconduct, the meaning of key words and
phrases, computations of value, alleged prejudicial misconduct by attorneys or trial judges, the necessary foundations for expert testimony,
the admissibility of hearsay, the competency of child witnesses, and
the like. Knowing only that the case being appealed was "civil" or
"criminal" would leave us ignorant about whether the appealable issues were peculiar to the narrow field or had universal ramifications.
If we investigated each record on appeal before assigning the
case to a civil or criminal docket, the energies spent in determining
which court should be deciding the issues will necessarily entail a sophisticated inquiry that drifts further and further from the litigants' request for attention. By inaugurating such a procedure, we will be nullifying any expected gain in speed of decision from the separate systems of
review. If, however, we automatically allowed the main characteristic of the litigation-civil or criminal-to determine where the case
will land, we will be assigning equivalent questions to different systems. The creation of distinct institutionalized channels will surely
lead to different results stemming from the same factual situations or
legal propositions-unless the civil and criminal lawyers who had professed indifference to each other's work began once again to research
each other's cases in search of relevant precedents. Must we travel
so far to get nowhere?
DEVELOPMENT OF NEW COURT HIERARCIES

i

The Hufstedler Committee, an insightful, articulate group appointed by the State Bar Board of Governors to investigate our appellate systems, has observed that much of our supreme court's work
involves a determination of whether to assume jurisdiction or grant a
hearing. "We are concerned that such a substantial amount of time
must be spent by our highest court not in deciding cases, but rather
in deciding not to decide them." 1 Searching for ways to reduce this
unproductive toil, the Committee has categorized the function of our
appellate system into two spheres: a review for correctness (i.e., an
21. Hufstedler Report, supra note 4, at 29.
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analysis of the trial court procedures to see whether the case was properly decided for the parties) and an institutional review (i.e., the handing down of definitive constitutional and statutory interpretations and
the development of our common law). The two spheres have been
given the following explanation:
In the review for correctness, the emphasis is upon having a
simple and inexpensive method of providing a final determination
as soon as possible. Intellectual exhaustion of the issues does
not have a high priority. On the other hand, for an institutional
review, the purpose is to have thorough consideration and careful
draftsmanship of an authoritative declaration of the law.22
As a means of gaining maximum benefit from a recognition of
these different spheres, the Committee proposed that the review for
correctness be joined directly to the trial of the case, to eliminate time
lag. "And a new, small court can be created (the 'Court of Review')
to handle institutional appeals and screen cases for the Supreme
Court.12 3 The review for correctness would be patterned after the
motion for new trial, with the trial judge joining two court of appeal
judges to re-evaluate the evidence, affirm the judgment, modify the
sentence or award of damages, or order a new trial on some or all
issues. (Use of the trial judge, however, is not essential but has been
suggested as more advantageous than a pure appellate bench.) After
the decision (given orally) is rendered, the litigants would not have
a right to further appeal but could petition for review, chiefly in the
24
newly created court of review.
The institutional review would lie within the court of review's jurisdiction. Inserted into the appellate structure between the present
court of appeal and the supreme court, the court of review would be
a small, statewide tribunal. It would accept cases only on the granting of a petition for hearing-and only as to those matters which
would be suitable for supreme court review. Following a "review"
decision, the litigants could petition the supreme court for a hearing. 25
Through these reforms, the Hufstedler Committee believes that the
ordinary case will be decided cheaply, quickly and correctly while
the policy-making case will receive sufficient time and attention to ensure a sound result. For an ultimate benefit, the supreme court will
have the opportunity of studying the court of review decision before
deciding whether a case is of such far-ranging significance that the
22.
23.
24.
25.

7d. at 31.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
Id.
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state's highest tribunal has an obligation to declare itself on the controversy.
Unfortunately-for the Hufstedler Committee's tone and credentials
are impeccable-the essential characteristics of its plan strike me as
being undesirable. The reforms it recommends depend on two vulnerable innovations, i.e., use of the trial judge as part of the appellate
board, and creation of a buffer court to establish statewide policy until the supreme court decides to act.
In recommending that the trial judge participate in the appeal, the
Committee believed that better trial decisions would result because
the judge would know in advance that his appellate colleagues will
expect him to articulate the basis for his determinations. Once seated
on the panel reviewing correctness, "The trial Judge will have an opportunity to point out the important occurrences in the trial courtroom."2 6
Because elimination of most trial transcripts is a subsidiary goal of
the Committee,2 7 the trial judge's presence is the only means by which
the appellate judges could obtain a supposedly objective factual report
on events at trial. Excluding him, as in the present style, would leave
the appellate bench powerless to decide which litigant's report of courtroom history was accurate. Excluding him would also remove the only
impartial link to demeanor evidence, that face-to-face evaluation which
may lead to disregard of a witness' testimony. 28 Excluding him, in
short, would leave the appellate bench constituted exactly as it now is,
except for its lesser information (caused by rejection of reporters' transcripts) and its greater powers (granted through its ability to enter new
judgments and change damage awards).
Including the trial judge is therefore an essential element of the
Committee's planned reforms, despite its disclaimer. By opting for
his inclusion, the Committee has ignored the cornerstone of our appellate practice: Every issue raised on appeal must first have been
raised in the court below.2 9 The trial judge has already had his
chance to make his ruling, either on a contemporaneous objection or
on a motion for new trial. What he did is the basis for the continuing
dispute.
When a ruling to correct error is sought in the lower court, the
strength behind the party's argument is that unless the judge rectifies
his own wrong a higher court will embarrass him with a reversal.
26. Id. at 35.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., WrrKIN, CALIFORNA EVImNCE, Introduction of Evidence at Trial
§1115 (2d ed. 1966).
Appeal §276 (2d ed. 1971).
29. See 6 WTKIN, CALr omu', PROCEDU,
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The judge's refusal to do so indicates his confidence that the overseers of the litigation will agree with him. In appealing from the
ruling, the party then argues, more or less courteously, "The judge
blundered so badly he deprived me of a fair trial and then refused the
chance to correct himself." Surely the target of this attack should be
prevented from trying to coax an appellate judge into supporting his
position and reputation for decision making. (On the three man bench
a 2 to 1 majority would be sufficient to endorse the trial judge's wisdom.)
To be fair, the review must be independent. Without distance between the reviewing judges and the disputed events, we foster a continuing partisanship and make judicial objectivity a test of whether
the appellate judges can renounce the past efforts of the trial court
judge sitting beside them. No such barriers should interefere with a
litigant's claim of error. An appellate decision should be based on the
established record and not on the private reminiscences of the trial
judge.
From another perspective, the Hufstedler Committee has bypassed
the difficulties and constitutionality of having an appellate bench
freely render new judgments instead of issuing remands for new trials.
By assuming this power, the reviewing court would make decisions
that ordinarily lie within the province of the jury. In my opinion, as
long as a party has the right to demand a jury trial on certain issues, he
is entitled to a jury's decision on those issues.8 0 He does not waive
this protection by telling an appellate court that the jury was forced
to proceed in a tainted atmosphere which needs correction. No matter how efficiently an appellate bench might substitute itself for the
laymen who would render a verdict in a new trial, the reviewing court
justices are an inappropriate medium to fashion new judgments or
damage awards. The judges must concern themselves with the process of decision rather than with its details.
In this process, what can we say about the idea of establishing a
court of review? Setting up a new tribunal is a cumbersome way to
protect the supreme court from being overwhelmed with disputes that
have major import only for the litigants themselves. Under the proposed system, a litigant aggrieved by the results of his review for correctness could petition the court of review for a hearing. Apparently if the petition is denied, the litigant would be allowed to petition the supreme court for a hearing, via a process assuring more delays and more paperwork-but no less of a caseload-than we now are
30. For current examples of a reviewing court's power to modify judgments, see
6 WrrsN, supra note 29, §528.
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complaining about. While this step is not articulated in the Hufstedler Committee report, a ban on petitions to the supreme court after
denial of a review hearing would mean that the court of review maintained absolute control over the cases which could reach the highest
tribunal. No such casual shifting of power ought to be mandated in the
guise of calendar reform.
If the court of review renders a decision on a case it deems suitable for supreme court consideration, the litigants may protest that

decision by petitioning the supreme court as the state's final judicial
authority. Many litigants will undoubtedly do so and will thus decrease the value of the court of review as a screening device. How
many other disappointed litigants will, because of weariness, accept
the court of review's opinion as final is unknown-but the process
of exhaustion (physical, emotional or financial) should not be encouraged as the way to protect our courts from having to adjudicate
the rights of aggrieved parties.
As a means of preserving significant litigation from attrition through
excessive paperwork, the Hufstedler Committee concluded that "A bypass of the Court of Review would be possible for cases of unusual
public concern or precedential value." 31 On a callous appraisal,
few cases would meet these standards. But we are dealing with active partisans, attorneys paid to recognize the civilization-enhancing
grandeur of their clients' demands. No prediction is more worthy of
short odds than the expectation that, for fame or a fee, attorneys will
routinely attempt to bypass the court of review whenever the supreme
court justices are likely to be more sympathetic to an issue than the review court judges would be.
Cases which now require only a direct appeal to the court of appeal, followed by a petition for hearing to the supreme court, would
travel a more complex route under the Hufstedler Committee reorganization plan. The first appellate court step would be a review for
correctness, followed either by a petition to the supreme court for a
"significant" case or a petition to the court of review for a "significant" case of lesser dimensions. A denial in either instance would allow the petition to be renewed in the court which had not yet been
approached. (If a direct review in the supreme court is specifically
authorized, we surely could not penalize a litigant for seeking that
channel by refusing to give him access to the court of review on the
ground that the supreme court declined to hear his case.) Assuming
that the court of review grants the petition, the resulting decision could
31. Hufstedler Report, supranote 4, at 34.
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then be brought to the supreme court's attention by another petition. All this, we should remind ourselves, has been proposed in the
name of simplicity.
The real failure of the court of review, in my opinion, is its tentative supremacy. Instead of deciding each assigned case on the merits as the court of appeal now does, the justices of the court of review would first have to brood about whether they wanted to hear a
particular dispute at all. The decisions to grant or withhold jurisdiction, though appropriate to the workings of our highest authority,
are wasted at the lower levels. How can the court of review judges
know what the supreme court judges rate as most significant, since
significance so often depends on a matter being raised for the first
time or another matter finally being ripe for changed treatment. The
screening process, by its choices as well as its eliminations, therefore
expends time and energy on classification rather than substance,
i.e., selecting a case as worthy or not worthy of attention. Yet these
classifications add nothing to our jurisprudence. They represent a
policy choice by a court which lacks the power to make policy and
cannot be given that power while the supreme court exists.
Where, then, is the judicial economy in having an intermediate
court agonize over what controversies it is willing to bother with?
While the court of appeal may presently be faulted only for arriving at
a wrong substantive result, the court of review could fall into error
by devoting its attention to the wrong matters and then for rendering the wrong decisions on those it heard. These enhanced opportunities for error are unjustifiably wasteful. If the pitfalls did not exist in
the Hufstedler Committee report, it would be unnecessary for anyone
to invent them.
NECESSITY OF EXTENSIVE RECORDS ON APPEAL

Much of the delay in processing an appeal can be attributed to the
time required for preparation of the appellate record, which ordinarily
consists of the clerk's transcript, 2 the reporter's transcript
and
designated exhibits.3 4 Although the record should be prepared and
certified within 30 days of an appropriate request, the superior court
judge has power to extend this time by a total of 90 days. The Chief
Justice or the Presiding Justices may use their unrestricted powers to
further waive the stated deadlines.3" More often than not, reporters
32. See 6 WnXim,
33. Id. §377.

34. id. §384.
35. id. §376.

supra note 29, §382.
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and clerks rely on this accommodation to ease their own schedules. As
a result, the hoped-for maincurrents of American jurisprudence become dependent on the daily tricklings from a transcriber's typewriter.
The process is tedious and expensive-yet I see no reasonable chance
of eliminating it. We have no alternative means of obtaining impartial accuracy in reconstructing the trial court history.
By demanding a faithful reproduction of litigated events, we help
answer two questions prominent in any appeal: Did the alleged error actually occur? If so, was it prejudicial in light of the entire
record? (No matter how complete a typewritten transcript is, it cannot reproduce a speaker's tone of voice or facial expression. To this
extent a written record must fail. In trying to overcome this weakness,
however, we should not scrap the stenographic record but must augment
it, within technological and economic limits, by new audio-visual aids.)
We may envy the ease by which geologists claim to understand prehistoric epochs from an analysis of a saurian molar, but we are
realists enough to know that geologic certainty has a leeway of several million years. The needs of litigants are more precise. Neither
plaintiffs nor defendants wish money to change hands or prison
doors to swing open or shut because of what might have been. What
was, is controlling. For this reason, we seldom turn to Rules of Court
numbers 6, 7, 35 and 36, which allow economy-minded attorneys to
prepare agreed statements or settled statements, recitals dependent on
a harmonious recall of trial court activity. Except for disputes of pure
law, where the facts are inconsequential, practicing attorneys routinely grumble and insist on a reporter's transcript as essential to an
appellate record.
Through reliance on Stenotype machines we do away with potential
quarrels inspired by wishful thinking, fugitive memory, selective recollection, purposeful misrepresentations and unintentional stupidity.
At a cost measured in dollars-generally chargeable to the losing party-we compel attorneys to stop tampering with an otherwise malleable past and to get on with the business of explaining why that
past was rightly or wrongly-but, in any event, definitely--enacted.
Appellate courts can be given no greater insight into the merits of a
case than the transcribed catalogue of its facts.
UsE oF LAw CLERKS AND RESEARCH ASSISTANTS
Whatever else an appellate judge does, we expect him to make decisions: judgment affirmed, judgment reversed, judgment modified
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as directed, I concur, I dissent. This decisiveness in the face of partisan contentions is the mainspring of his office. Paid to be neutral and knowledgeable, he must say "Yes" or "No" to the self-interested cries of "Mine, all mine." For the winning party, the judicial process of finding truth is often secondary to its cash value; for
the losing party, the price of defeat is seldom relieved by the elegance
of the analysis. Results alone count. The in-chamber mechanics of
decision, which are conducted off the record, therefore have greater
significance than the public revelations made through a written opinion, on how that result was attained. As long as the steps are
secretly taken, suspicion will arise that we are being deprived of a true
insight into the decision making process. Since the days when Moses
produced the Commandments from Sinai, we have warily surmised that
it is the underling, rather than the ruling presence, who inscribes the
law.ae
The fear of low-level decision making, of a court isolated by its
staff memos from the litigants' best arguments, necessarily troubles us.
Yet we realize that judges, like other professionals in short supply and
heavy demand, must spend their productive hours free of the menial
work which is properly assignable to their assistants. Someone-preferably a law clerk, research assistant or staff attorney-should be
available to verify that, at Reporter Transcript 68, the trial judge did
indeed interrupt defense counsel's cross-examination of a key witness, or that the current interpretations of the "plain smell" rule do
allow a police officer some leeway in relying on suspicious odors to
justify a search, or that neither party mentioned how the retroactivity
or nonretroactivity of a leading case affected their arguments. As
a recent announcement seeking applicants for a staff vacancy of the
court of appeal described the position, "Staff attorneys assist the court
in examining writ applications and appeals, writing analyses and memoranda, and drafting orders. There are no fixed eligibility requirements, but to fill this particular position the court is looking for a
lawyer with substantial experience in general practice, including trial

work."117

In language geared to a job market, we can set forth a division of
labor between the magistrate, who decides, and the researcher, who
anonymously carries out the lesser chores. Though we easily do so,
we wonder all the same whether the judge's daily dependence on his
36. See, e.g., Gustafson, supra note 4, at 202: "Research attorneys, in varying
degrees from court to court, do sometimes write opinions and, in effect, decide cases."
Cf. Molinari, supra note 4, at 609.
37. Los Angeles Metropolitan News, March 27, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
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assistant will blur the distinctions between their different roles. No
matter how determined we are for an answer, we will never receive a
universally satisfactory one. Some staff attorneys will influence some
judges more than other staff attorneys will influence other judges. Beyond that, we cannot predict results or relationships. Given the presence of a nonaccountable aide (i.e., accountable only to the man
whose work he may be doing), we either have faith that the court
system's inner workings will be responsible and self-enforcing, or we
lay claim to a permanent unanswerable challenge to our judicial system, fueled by every denial of its significance. (Requiring all judicial deliberations to be carried out in public might be an alternative
proposal. The gain in showmanship, however, would hardly accelerate the decision making process, and the open discussions would still
lead to misgivings that the judges were improperly briefed before their
entrances.)
By suggesting that staff researchers take over the initial screening
and analysis of cases-thus unavoidably giving some flavor to the ultimate decisions-I align myself with the institutional faithful. I
concede that one case in X number of cases might be differently decided if each judge steeped himself in i-dotting, t-crossing drudgery. But I believe that the numerical equivalent of X-the balance
between injustice and de minimus-is too small to excuse delays
(and therefore denials of relief) in the known mass of litigation which
will jam the calendar during the judge's generally unproductive labors. If our reviewing court judges are to do the job we expect of
them-maintaining quality with ever-increasing caseloads-we must
strengthen their professional staffs and encourage the delegation of
nondecisional work. Of a future Solomon, it might admiringly be
said, "None of the losers liked his decisions, but they all agreed his
facts were accurate. What a staff he must have."
As a near-warranty of integrity in these appellate procedures, the
strongest control over staff personnel in their dealings with the judges
is an ordinary sense of personal relationships. The judge is the boss.
What he says and does are the final mandates on an issue. Through
some mishap he might be so weak-willed, indecisive and lazy that the
prerogatives of his office oppress him to the point where he abandons
his responsibilities to his assistants. (Debilitating illness is a real example.) Yet the picture of a judge at bay in his chambers, while his
subordinates trick or bully him into accepting their views, is more
to be fancied than to be feared. A trained legal staff, relied on by
judges aware of their own duties, is an inescapable feature of our reviewing court structure.
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NEED FOR WIDESPREAD CURTAILMENT OF ORAL ARGUMENT

No part of the appellate process can be as gratifying to an attorney
as oral argument. After weeks of research and brief writing, and
months of waiting, he finally stands forth at a lectern, silver water
pitcher and paper cup within reach, to show the bench how much
more than any judge he knows about the law in general and his case in
particular. What he says for the next few minutes some commentators consider indispensable.
Not only do judges who have not carefully studied the brief in advance get their first impression of a case from the argument. The
argument alone provides them with an opportunity to have their
38
particular doubts and misunderstandings cleared up by counsel.
4, .*°*

[The written brief, save in the rarest instances, cannot hope to
move its readers. It achieves its objective if it convinces. The
aim of the oral argument, however, is to persuade. The human
presence and particularly the human voice can convey meanings, can produce reactions, both favorable and unfavorable, far

beyond the power of the printed page. More often than most
counsel imagine, the oral argument may change a judge's mind,
no matter how carefully he may have studied the briefs in advance. There are several reasons for this: first, ideas are developed in the clash of oral argument that never appear on the
printed pages of the brief; second, many judges by reason of their
years of courtroom experience get more through the ear than
they do through the eye; finally, the oral argument inevitably tends
to develop far better than any brief the case as a whole in a way
that delights the mind of a judge who has an instinct for order and
system.

9

Good oral argument before a bench not too large is excellent insurance against one-judge decisions.4 0

With the general sweep of these propositions I can placidly agree.
Face-to-face communications, whether verbal or nonverbal, differ
from written communications in their physical existence, style and
impact. Outside the legal field, do any of us doubt that the factual
accuracy of a bound report on Earth's only satellite will turn the heads

of fewer young ladies than the shared sight of a full moon at a mur38. R. STERN & E.

GRESSumN, SUPREnM COURT PRACTICE 352 (3d ed. 1962).
39. A. VANDERiLT, supra note 3, at 1090. See also L. ORPiELD, supra note 20,
at 158.

40. R. POUND,

APPELLATE PRoCEDURES ix

Crv.

CASES 393 (1941).
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inuring lakeshore? In our litigation experience, therefore, we may
reasonably expect to find equivalent variances between the secluded
reading of appellate briefs and the observations made during oral
argument. Even so, we should ask whether these differences are
substantial enough in legal contemplation to require that we routinely perpetuate these separable elements of review. For my part,
I would discontinue oral argument except for two situations: where
any judge of the court requests it, or where counsel explains why his
brief cannot exhaust his position.
The appellant's self-invoked assignment is to show that errors of
law during the proceedings have resulted in a miscarriage of justice.41
The errors, presumably, can be identified and the prejudice they
caused, articulated. If so, this data should be marshaled in the opening brief; if not, the appeal is subject to dismissal as frivolous. 42
Against this onslaught on his trial court victory, the respondent must
find his own sanctuary in the established record. Like the appellant,
he will try to develop his legal position clearly enough for the bench
to respect it. To offset this counterattack, the appellant may then file
a reply brief which invariably argues that the respondent's assertions
cannot cleanse the tainted judgment.
At this sequence of thrust, parry and counterthrust, what significance does vocal underlining have? Where will chatter help? The
issues have been framed, substantiated and exhausted in print, where
they await judicial scrutiny.4 3 All that interferes with the finality of
this persuasive effort is the brief writer's fear that his client's excellence
has lost some sparkle in its confinement to a bloodless page. Dylan
Thomas, speaking about his poems, once described them as "little
lyrical cripples;" despite our best efforts in prose, we might well consider our briefs to be in an even more disabled condition. But the
short answer to our grievance is that appellate lawyers ought to know
their business. The ability to manage ideas convincingly is our stock
in trade. Whether paid by the hour, by the job or by the result, we
are really selling words. Our failure to set them down effectively is
a signal that we have signed up for the wrong court.
In some litigation, perhaps, an attorney could demonstrate that the
near incomprehensibility of his subject matter is assurance enough
that a written description of its characteristics will be inherently inadequate. (Each of us will have to supply his own examples; my own
41. See 6 WrriKN, supra note 29, §209.
42. Id. §475.
43. Id. §487. The parties may not raise new points on oral argument.
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fear is that some day I will have to write about the rule against perpetuities as though I understood it.) By showing in the brief itself where-and why--difficult concepts have remained vague, the attorney may reasonably urge the court to hear his supplemental oral
argument. Beyond this indication that his weakness can be overcome
through a public soliloquy, however, he should expect to write everything he has to say. 44
Converting oral argument from a matter of right to one of judicial
discretion, of course, will still leave courts free to share a litigant's
doubts about the sufficiency of his brief and to order the parties to appear for a verbal exchange. On every issue for which a judge has
questions, the courtroom should be opened for possible spoken answers. Stubborn details, which the bench cannot subdue by staff work
and its own analyses, would provide the focus of the hearing. By
exploring the possible implications of an argument, by viewing facts
from a perspective which the litigants have overlooked, by clarifying
what appears to be a doubtful proposition, the courts will get full
benefit from the exchange while the litigants will be given a fair
hearing on the issues they themselves had developed.
To justify abandonment of oral argument, however, the level of
judicial awareness must be raised from its present posture where judges
suffer from a chronic lack of information about the disputes advancing along their calendars, to a level where they know what problems
to expect. Under present procedures, at the time a case is given a
date for argument, a research assistant is ordinarily assigned to prepare a memorandum discussing its facts, analyzing the law and recommending a disposition. 45
44. The California Constitution, in article VI, Sections 2 and 3, requires that a
reviewing court judgment be supported by judges who were "present at the argument."
While a constitutional amendment might appear necessary before oral argument could
formally be abolished, except at the court's option, the Clerk of the Court of Appeal
for the First Appellate District has been distributing the following letter to appellate
attorneys in suitable cases:
All of the briefs to be filed in the above entitled case are now before us.
The court does not presently desire oral argument in this case. If counsel for
the parties are willing to waive argument, the court will commence at once
the process of research with a view to arriving at a decision at the earliest
practicable date. It is not possible to predict the date of decision at this time.
However, it is our conclusion that waiver of argument expedites the business
of the court.
If council desires to argue the case, it will be placed on the calendar in due
course.
If argument is waived and during the course of research the court desires
comment from counsel or the answering of questions, counsel will be informed
and the case will be placed on the calendar which next follows the communication from the court to counsel. So that the matter of waiver may be handled expeditiously, I shall, -by direction of the court, enter a waiver in the register of actions unless I receive from counsel notice by letter that argument is
not waived within 10 days from the date of this letter.
45. Molinari, supranote 4, at 609.
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Since a calendar memorandum must be prepared in each case,
and since each judge has only one law clerk to assist him, it is not
always possible to complete and distribute each memorandum at
least a week before argument. Some of the memoranda are not
completed until a few days before, or even on the eve of oral
argument. In these cases the judges have only enough time to
read the memoranda and are unable to study the briefs or make
any independent research before the conference.4 6
The ignorant judge, no matter how potent his excuses, is a threat
to the appellate process. His existence frustrates our hope for an impartial, informed judiciary and distorts a three man bench into a one
man court dominated by the judge who has been assigned to write the
opinion. 47 Deploring this condition, as we must, we still cannot eliminate it through oral argument which, of necessity, is skimpier in detail than a written brief. (The judge who will not read, may, with equal
composure, not listen either.) Our most effective answer should be the
scaling down of the reviewing courts' workload so that conscientious
judges will have an opportunity to utilize their best efforts in making
each decision which confronts them. What of their slothful, timeserving colleagues, assuming they exist? Short of outsiders prying into
the decision-making conferences, an inhibiting scrutiny which could
scuttle judicial independence, we must trust to the judges' self-policing
of their own transactions, backed by the removal power which can
be exercised by the Commission on Judicial Qualifications. 48 As an additional prod to remind them of their duties, we should insist that for
every case on which oral argument is barred, each judge, like a process
server or a party filing a verified pleading, should certify:
"I have read the briefs in this case, am familiar with the issues
raised, and know of no benefit which oral argument could produce."
Having litigants mail-in briefs and distantly await a mailed-out
decision, without ever personally confronting their adversaries or their
judges, does seem to be robotizing justice. Admittedly, the further we
remove our judges from the people and events which constitute a lawsuit, the more doubtful we become that the law has relevance to human
problems. Yet we must remember that the parties have already had
their traditional chance to look a judge (and, on request, a jury) in the
eye and plead their case with all the personality and psychic factors
46. Id. at 610. In some districts, research attorneys working under a principal
attorney have been added to the court staff and work for the entire bench instead of a
single judge or division.
47. See Gustafson, supra note 4, at 198, 199.
48. See CAL. CoN ST. art. VI, §18.
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available to enhance their facts. That showmanship-a vital part
of all litigation in the earlier phases-must recede on an appeal, if
only because the reviewing court's work has become otherwise unmanageable. However therapeutic oral argument may be, the time it demands from the court outweighs the benefits it produces. Public displays of attention unfortunately must yield to the more productive
work of reaching a sound decision in a timely manner.
DESIRABILITY OF MINIMIZING WRITTEN OPINIONS

The California Constitution declares that: "Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that determine causes shall be in
writing with reasons stated."49
From this apparently welcome directive, which prohibits such
rulings as "Death. No explanation,"5 has arisen a body of literature
that its authors seemingly enjoy but its intended audience is unlikely
to read. The "reasons stated" proliferate in volume after volume of
official reports (and in file cabinet after file cabinet of unpublished
opinions),51 while the litigants mark time waiting for the essays on
which their fortunes or freedom are staked. The justifications for
continued opinion-writing, however, are real. As the cornerstone
of systematic jurisprudence, written opinions answer newly arisen
questions of law, describe changes in prior law and give assurances
that established law, on current re-examination, is still valid; they
notify the litigants about the reasons for sustaining or reversing a judgment (and perhaps mollify the parties for having spent so much money
on an appeal), alert subordinate and equal-level courts to strive for
uniformity of decision, and inform higher courts of why the result was
reached; they establish patterns to guide clients in future transactions
and lawyers in future litigation-or the avoidance of litigation; they
open the court's thought processes to public scrutiny and educate the
citizenry while guarding against arbitrary actions by the judges themselves; they make certain a decision is supported by thought, rather
than impulse, and limit the influence of the single judge on a panel
who is most familiar with the briefs and record; they provide a historical record of justice-its strengths and weaknesses-in contemporary
49. CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §14; cf. the lament, "My desire is .

versary had written a book."

31 lob 35 (King James).

.

. that mine ad-

50. "La mort sans phrase." Reputed, perhaps inaccurately, to be the sentence
pronounced on Louis XVI by the Abbe Sieyes. See L. O'BRMN, THm WTING OF
isRSOY 91 (Univ. of Calif. Syllabus Series 1935).
51. See JuDIcIL CouNcIl oF CALipwOmUA 1972 ANNUAL REPoRT 75; CAL. R. Ci'.
No. 976; 6 WrrxrN, supra note 29, §508; Gustafson, supra note 4, at 204.
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society. And yet . . . and yet, they arrive so late. Despite its virtues, the full written opinion can no longer be conventionally expected
in every case under review. In my opinion, the system must be
changed.
It is true there is a real and important function of an opinion as
a check upon the bench. But that purpose and the purpose of
advising the reviewing court, if the cause goes to the ultimate court
of review, as to the reasons and basis of the decision, would be
served sufficiently by a memorandum of the questions decided and
the grounds of decision. Much time and energy are spent in writing opinions in cases which involve no new questions or new
phases of old questions. This is a prime source of waste of judicial power in our higher courts. A short statement of points and
reasons will suffice both as a check and as an aid to the higher
court.52

Under existing California practice, we have managed to find short
cuts past our constitutional mandate. No written opinion is required
for an order dismissing an appeal or original proceeding, or for the
initial denial of a petition for an extraordinary writ." In cases which
pose no substantial issues, memorandum opinions-making no attempt to recite facts or discuss legal concepts-are increasingly being
used. 54 By authorizing high standards for the publication of an opinion, the court rules discourage the writing of decisions that will be
published only on an office copying machine and distributed only to a
readership of directly affected litigants.5 5 The administrative goal
presumably is that the more restricted the potential audience, the less
the verbiage-with no lessening in the "rightness" of the result.
So far, hopefully, so good. The courts themselves are exercising
self-restraint in the proliferation of opinions. But I would go further
-and would do so by giving the litigants more control over the reviewing process. At all stages below the appellate court level, from
52. R. POUND, Ap.mixrn PRocnminR IN CirL CASES 390 (1941). See also
R. Cr. app., div. 1, §6, suggesting use of a memorandum or other abbreviated
opinion for cases that raise no substantial issue of law or fact. But cf. Gustafson,
supra note 4, at 204.
53. See 6 Wrrxn,, supra note 29, §493. The court's failure to state its reasons
for denying petitions for habeas corpus is, in my opinion, a mistake. Because the
applications for relief fall into predictable categories, I have recommended use of a
check-list to provide at least minimal information to unsuccessful prisoners. See
Leavitt, A Study of Post-conviction Procedures in California, JUDICuL CoUNcIL oF
CALIFORniA, 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 23, 42. Whether an equivalent check-list could
be developed for other areas of the law and, if so, whether its use would be beneficial
are questions worthy of some inquiry.
54. 6 WrrIN, supra note 29, §§497-98.
55. See 6 WrnuN, supra note 29, §§506-09; CAL. R. Cr. No. 976. See also
California Official Reports, Cumulative Subsequent History Table, 65 (Aug. 3, 1972),
declaring that pursuant to supreme court order a named court of appeal decision was
not to be published because "it cites an unpublished opinion."
CAL.
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the framing of pleadings to the preparation of findings of fact, conclusions of law, orders and judgments, the litigants' attorneys prepare-i.e., write and have typed-the operative documents. Even as
to the granting of a new trial for insufficiency of evidence, where
the trial judge is statutorily required to prepare his own order and
specification of reasons, the successful attorney may voluntarily submit relevant documents to assist the bench.5 6 Subject to jurisdictional, administrative and ethical controls, the lawsuit is left to the affected parties' own evaluation of the controversy. Why then-when
the same amount of money, property or punishment is at issue as it
was earlier in the litigation-do we keep the parties from sharing in
the appellate proceedings except as recognized advocates? I would
abolish the distinction which permits an attorney of record to serve as
a working functionary of the bench at the trial level but which prohibits him from helping to shape the appellate decision in a direct fashion. Once the parties are given additional power to cope with their own
calendared destinies, the results should gratify them and ease the judges'
workload.
Toward this end I suggest that most cases should receive only memorandum opinions which list the points raised and note in whose favor
the issues were resolved. Speed will be the key virtue. For impatient
parties who prefer an even speedier decision, the appellate court should
accept a waiver of written opinion in exchange for an accelerated place
on the calendar. (Reversals, of course, will require explicit instructions
to the trial judge.) For those parties who rate content as more important
than speed, a full written opinion would be served when all the litigants
requested it in their briefs. (Allowing any party to obtain a written
opinion would mean that the litigant enjoying delay would always
clamor for an extended analysis. But allowing a single party to block an
otherwise sought-after written opinion would mean that a chronic
offender or institutional litigant might wish to keep the court's decision
out of the public eye. To resolve this difficulty, a party should be
allowed to state in his brief why, for policy reasons, a full opinion is
advisable.) Needless to say, if the court, on examination of the issues
involved, desired to expand an "opinionless" case or present only a memorandum in a "full-scale" controversy, the judges would be free to make
those choices.
By using this procedure, we can assure the litigants that the function of the appellate process is what they had supposed it was, i.e., to
56. See CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §657; 5 WnrKIN, CALivoRNA PROCEDURE, Attack
on Judgment in Trial Court §87 (2d ed. 1971).
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serve their specific needs on the principle that community well-being
is the product of widespread individual attention.
The logistics of the decision making process should also be shifted
to the litigants' typewriters. Just as trial lawyers submit proposed instructions to the judge for delivery to the jury, appellate attorneys
should be deemed capable of submitting appropriate statements for
a memorandum opinion or, in the event of a reversal or modification,
specific directions for the trial judge to follow. Every brief should
be required to have a section devoted to the litigant's recommended
sample opinion, which the court could use as it saw fit-hopefully as a
time-saving aid, at worst as a warning of what to avoid in a judicious
presentation. (Complaints about attorneys' brief-writing abilities are
common enough to raise doubts that we can write creditable opinions. Yet if judges appointed from our ranks can do so, attorneyswith more direct motivation at issue-ought to be given an equivalent
chance.)
A possible casualty in this scheme of having unargued, unwritten
decisions is uniform application of the law throughout the state. Aspiring for equal treatment of all similarly situated persons, we know
that unless judges are informed about the way a set of facts was
characterized and disposed of by other judges, their individual differences will lead to inconsistent treatment of litigants. To control this
problem, we must recognize that publication of all opinions as a means
of educating judges will be self-defeating. The cumbersome volume
of materials will prevent anyone from mastering the field.5" By selective publication, we seek to preserve only those cases which can
and should guide decisions; any variation from the established rules
would justify a court in writing about and publishing the new trend.
What differences in results still exist, therefore, must be minimized
with tools other than written opinions which pass, expensively unnoticed, from the publisher to the bookshelf.
The most suitable means of preventing judicial anomalies appears
to be operative, i.e., periodic statewide conferences of judges under
the guidance of the Chief Justice and the Judicial Council,5 s or under
other official auspices, to educate the bench and, without infringing
on each judge's independence, to strive for uniform disposition of
cases. Because uniformity, in itself, is always a questionable virtue
57. See, e.g., People v. Crafts, 13 Cal. App. 3d 457, 460, 91 Cal. Rptr. 563, 564
(1970), which insists that attorneys provide trial judges with up-to-date precedents
about which the judges themselves cannot keep current.
58. See CAL. CoNsr. art. VI, §6.
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when divorced from the results we seek to make universal, this administrative confrontation should be more effective than a chronological comparison of results. "Who decided first?" will yield to "Which
is the better view?"
CONCLUSION

Courts of review attempt to satisfy two major needs in our legal
system: the correction of specific unfairness in existing cases and the
assurance that future unfairness, in cases yet to be imagined, will also
be corrected. To grant specific relief, a court must make the right decision and inform knowledgeable litigants which parts of the record
compelled its action. Pleased or not, the litigants will have the source
materials to substantiate (or grumble about) the result. But to promise future protection for unknown parties, i.e., for the general public,
a court must do more. It must arrive at the right decision in the existing case, articulate its reasons in such detail that strangers to the
litigation can accept its conclusions, and make its opinion available
to all interested persons.
My proposals for court reform emphasize results for current litigants and minimize literary explanations. As I have suggested, we
should speed-up the appellate process by openly acknowledged use of
law clerks and research assistants for screening purposes and the writing of research memoranda; we should curtail oral argument when the
judges certify that they know of no benefits which could be produced
by discussions in open court; we should abandon full-scale written
opinions in routine cases; we should allow the litigants, through their
attorneys, to waive a written opinion in favor of a rapid decision or to
request a full analysis at the price of a delayed result, and we should
require the attorneys to provide sample opinions in their briefs; we
should have periodic judicial conferences to encourage uniformity in
decisions throughout the state.
Although my emphasis on present results appears to victimize
future jurisprudence by destroying its sources of information, I believe
that the worst way to prepare for tomorrow's problems is to keep today's difficulties interminably churning. Unless our courts can make
prompt decisions-now!--our future will be devoted to struggling
with backlogs rather than resolving contemporary litigation.
An abbreviated system of appellate review, of course, may fail. If
it does, we shall all be the losers. But if we lack the confidence in
our judges to give them the tools for succcess, can we ever develop a
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comforting way of reviewing lower court decisions? I think not. Since
our adversary procedures must produce winners and losers (all of
whom might be disappointed at the result), the most we can ask of
our judges is that, in a timely way, they render decisions which have
a dimension beyond rightness or wrongness. All things considered, the
results must be fair.

tegrity, not mechanics.

. .

and fairness will always be a product of in-

